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Americanism behind Barbed Wire
Eric L. MULLER
THE UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA AT CHAPEL HILL
It was impossible to live in the United States through the election of Barack
Obama to the presidency without feeling that the country was turning a corner in
its racial history. The cover of the January/February issue of The Atlantic
magazine captured the mood well: over a close-up photograph of the President’s
light-brown face were emblazoned the words “The End of White America?” The
magazine’s cover story described “[t]he election of Barack Obama [as] just the
most startling manifestation of a larger trend: the gradual erosion of ‘whiteness’
as the touchstone of what it means to be an American.”
1
Surely it is premature to
claim that the United States has entered an era in which race no longer plays any
role in signifying who counts as fully American and who does not. But there can
be no doubt that the role of race is waning.
I would like to point you to an additional striking illustration of this shift, one
that preceded Obama’s election by several years, and should be a matter of
considerable interest to those who study the experience of Japanese Americans in
the United States. It might come as a surprise to you that the two most prominent
military critics of the Iraq War to speak out while still wearing their uniforms
were American citizens of Japanese ancestry: Eric Shinseki, the retired four-star
general and former Army Chief of Staff, and Ehren Watada, a First Lieutenant in
the U.S. Army. In 2003, General Shinseki dared to publicly question the wisdom
of Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld’s plan to attempt the invasion and military
occupation of Iraq with dangerously inadequate numbers of U.S. troops.
2
In
2006, Lieutenant Watada was the first commissioned officer to refuse deployment
to Iraq on the ground that the invasion was illegal.
3
On their merits, the two
soldiers’ public criticisms had nothing in common: Shinseki dissented over the
invasion’s effectiveness while Watada dissented over the invasion’s legality. Yet
both men dared to criticize American military policy from within, and both are
Japanese Americans.
If this fact does not come as a surprise to you, it most certainly would have
come as a surprise to Sergeant-Major Tokutaro Nishimura Slocum. Known to his
friends as “Tokie,” Slocum was an “Issei” or first-generation Japanese immigrant
to the United States who volunteered into the U.S. Army in World War I, fought
and was gassed alongside other American soldiers on the battlefields of Europe,
and then spent years trying to persuade the Congress that his patriotic sacrifice in
the Great War entitled him to exemption from the law that then barred all Asians
13
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from becoming American citizens.
4
Shinseki’s and Watada’s public criticisms
would also have come as a surprise to Mike Masaoka, a leader of the “Nisei”
generation of birthright citizens that followed Slocum’s immigrant generation.
Masaoka was the National Secretary and Field Executive of the super-patriotic
and fiercely assimilationist Japanese American Citizens League (“JACL”) at the
outbreak of the Second World War. He spearheaded that organization’s efforts to
cooperate with the U.S. government’s plan for the mass removal and detention of
every person of Japanese ancestry along the West Coast, alien and citizen alike.
5
Pressing his fellow Nisei to act as “better Americans in a greater America,”
6
Masaoka and the JACL worked to suppress Nisei protest of the government’s
program of racial removal and incarceration, fearing that resistance would
undermine the Nisei generation’s claim to good Americanism.
It is hard not to picture these two Issei and Nisei leaders cringing in horror at
the spectacle of two uniformed Sansei, Eric Shinseki and Ehren Watada, publicly
doubting the wisdom and legality of an American military venture. But the fact
that these two soldiers felt the American ground beneath them firm enough to
support a critical posture during wartime speaks volumes about the distance the
nation traveled from the first third of the twentieth century to the first decade of
the twenty-first. The racial bar to membership in the American polity that
excluded those of Tokie Slocum’s generation crumbled. The possibility of loyal
protest and dissent―an option unthinkable to Mike Masaoka―became available.
How did this change take place? When did the doors of Americanism open to
Japanese Americans?
In this paper I hope to shed at least a bit of new light on these questions by
looking in an unexpected place: the episode in which the federal government
removed all people of Japanese ancestry from the West Coast and incarcerated
them during World War II, a period commonly (though erroneously) referred to
as the Japanese American internment.
7
This is an unexpected place to look for
data on the shifting definition of Americanism for Japanese Americans because
this tragic episode is commonly understood as the high-water mark of twentieth-
century racialism. Race, it is typically thought, was so powerful a determinant of
Americanism at this moment of peril that even the Nisei, who held birthright
citizenship under the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, were
stripped of all of the rights of citizenship and treated as constructive enemy aliens
for the war’s duration.
This is indeed how the government viewed the Nisei in early 1942 when the
repressive program began. But that monolithic assessment of the failed
Americanism of Japanese Americans quickly fell apart. Careful examination of
the approaches to citizenship and protest taken across the various agencies of the
federal government in the years between 1942 and 1945 reveals surprisingly
vibrant disagreement over the capacity of the Nisei to count as good Americans.
Military and civilian agencies differed sharply over the extent to which outwardly
“American” cultural practices and a willingness to submit to repression were
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preconditions for membership in the American polity. To be sure, no government
agency fixed the boundaries of Americanism in the places we might fix them
today; all operated in the context of their time. Yet the fact that some wartime
bureaucrats managed to sustain an idea of Americanism that tolerated cultural
difference even minimally and allowed even a little space for dissent is
noteworthy. That fact suggests that the door of a more multicultural and tolerant
Americanism, long thought tightly closed in the years before and during the war,
was already at least a bit ajar.
＊ ＊ ＊
I have noted that there is a conventional understanding of the racialist
definition of Americanism in the war years, and that the claim in this paper at
least modestly complicates it. To place my evidence in its proper context, I
should first offer a somewhat fuller statement of this conventional account, and of
the larger narrative about Americanism in the twentieth century in which this
conventional account sits.
The nation entered the twentieth century with rival conceptions of
Americanism, but with one particular model very much in ascendancy: the
Americanism of Theodore Roosevelt. This was a fervently assimilationist
Americanism, a norm of good citizenship that rejected all foreign attachment.
Writing in the 1890s, Roosevelt acknowledged the huge wave of immigrants from
Europe that was breaking on American shores, but avowed that the question of
whether this European influx was good or bad “depend[ed] mainly on whether
these newcomers do or do not throw themselves heartily into our national life,
cease to be Europeans, and become Americans like the rest of us.” There was no
room in Roosevelt’s America for “immigrants, or the sons of immigrants, . . .
[who] cling to the speech, the customs, the ways of life, and the habits of thought
of the Old World which they have left.” Naturally, Roosevelt’s Americanism
also had no room for members of “races which do not readily assimilate with our
own”―meaning most particularly those from Asia. But even white Europeans
who remained “unassimilated” were “mere obstructions to the current of our
national life.”
8
Those immigrants who hyphenated their Americanism, modifying
it with the land of their or their parents’ birth, were and could not be true
Americans.
This so-called “anti-hyphenate” movement dominated the Progressive
movement through the first two decades of the twentieth century, first under
Roosevelt himself as President and then under Woodrow Wilson, particularly in
his second term.
9
It was not, however, the only understanding of Americanism
that was mooted among Progressive-era intellectuals. A rival approach, that of a
group some call the “cosmopolitans,” understood Americanism as depending not
on the eradication but the preservation of cultural differences among immigrant
communities. These cosmopolitans―scholars and activists as diverse as Eugene
V. Debs, W. E. B. Du Bois, Jane Addams, and Louis Brandeis―shared the
conviction that “American civilization had the potential to be richer than its
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European counterparts because it was woven from more variegated thread.”
10
Horace Kallen supplied the most succinct statement of this vision of Americanism
in an article called “Democracy Versus the Melting Pot” that he published in the
Nation in 1915. Kallen saw America as “a democracy of nationalities,
cooperating voluntarily and autonomously in the enterprise of self-realization
through the perfection of men according to their kind.” The idea that in America
“men” have a “kind”―an ethnic and cultural affiliate group―was central to
Kallen’s views, as it also was to the nativist thinkers of Kallen’s day who were
twisting Darwinian and eugenic theories to enforce a rigid racial and ethnic
hierarchy with whites of Anglo and Nordic ancestry at its pinnacle. Kallen and
the cosmopolitans, however, saw virtue in immigrant groups’ retention of their
discrete cultural identities. Through their ethnic and cultural attachments,
immigrants could help “American civilization” transform itself into “the
perfection of the cooperative harmonies of ‘European civilization,’” a
“multiplicity in a unity, an orchestration of mankind” in which each group
contributed its own “specific timbre and tonality,” its own “theme and melody” to
“the whole symphony” of society.
11
This cosmopolitan vision did not manage to transcend its time on matters of
race: only European instruments played in Kallen’s American orchestra. At least
at this point in his career, Kallen had nothing at all to say about people of African
or Asian ancestry.
12
Nonetheless, it is significant that the debate over
Americanism in early twentieth-century America included an articulate voice
preaching the preservation rather than the eradication of cultural difference.
It is harder to tease out from the work of the cosmopolitan progressives a
conception of the extent to which good Americanism included the possibility of
voicing disaffection with America. The great “hyphenation” debate turned on
other matters; dissent was something that a scholar like Kallen had no occasion to
address. However, certain of the other cosmopolitans did have such occasion.
Louis Brandeis, for example, articulated a provocatively contingent definition of
Americanism in his “True Americanism” address at Faneuil Hall in Boston on
July 5, 1915. To “Americanize” an immigrant, said Brandeis, was to bring him
“into complete harmony with our ideals,” but those ideals included a number of
substantive and procedural guarantees to the immigrant: equal treatment, a
reasonable income, public education, protection from overweening industrial
power, and social insurance. Brandeis noted that some immigrants came to
American shores needing no “Americanizing” at all; even though newly arrived,
they were already “true Americans” in their full embrace of American ideals.
The nation would fail these new but “true Americans,” Brandeis suggested, if the
nation itself treated the immigrants inconsistently with those ideals and violated
their rights. An immigrant’s good Americanism could often turn out to be
America’s to lose, rather than the immigrant’s to prove.
13
The entry of the United States into World War I and the First Red Scare either
ended the aspirations of the cosmopolitan progressives or drove them very deep
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underground. Woodrow Wilson, who in his first term from 1912 to 1916 at least
modestly resisted the nativism and racialist assimilationism of the day, caved to
those pressures as a “war President” in his second term.
14
Wilson’s Americanism
turned to “100 percent Americanism” ; fears of Germans and communists
broadened into suspicion of anyone who modified the term “American” with a
hyphen. The nativist and racialist instincts that had managed to capture only parts
of the American South and West in the pre-war years came to dominate the
national political discourse. Attorney General Palmer’s notorious raids for
subversives focused heavily on dispreferred immigrant groups. And of course the
1924 Johnson-Reed Act, while scaling back on the immigration of whites from
Southern and Eastern Europe, completely cut off further immigration by Asians,
including people from Japan.
In this environment, the ethnic and cultural pluralism of the pre-war
cosmopolitans went into what John Higham called full “eclipse” ;
15
liberals
flocked to the older “melting pot” theory in which the heat of assimilationism
boiled away an immigrant’s racial and ethnic distinctions and commitments. At
the University of Chicago, sociologist Robert E. Park worked to transform the
melting pot into a full-blown theory of assimilation that made good Americanism
available even to non-whites, something that a progressive scholar like Horace
Kallen had not been able to imagine. In this interwar period, when the
commanding national discourse preached that race and nationality were all-
important determinants of Americanism, the reactive liberal response was to
contend that race and ethnicity were meaningless.
16
It is in this context that one can appreciate the poignancy of Tokie Slocum’s
effort through the mid-1930s to obtain American citizenship as a reward for his
military service in the U.S. Army in World War I. As Lucy Salyer explains,
“[b]y the 1920s, martial patriotism and racial nativism had made being ‘yellow’
―the term referred both to the refusal to serve in the military and to the racially
constructed category―grounds for exclusion from citizenship.”
17
The only
workable strategy for a Japanese immigrant like Slocum to qualify for
membership in the American polity was to spill blood on a battlefield in soldierly
obedience and then appeal to Congress for a special exemption from the racial
bar.
The conventional account of World War II in this narrative defines it as the
climax of this long-growing racial nativism in the nation’s conception of
Americanism. Race became not simply a bar to new citizenship but a destructor
of old: notwithstanding their own birthright citizenship, the Nisei were consigned
to the same dismal program of removal and incarceration as their non-citizen
parents. Race simply consumed the rights of citizens, turning the Nisei into aliens
in their own land. In Mae Ngai’s words, the government “nullified the[ ]
citizenship” of Japanese Americans “exclusively on grounds of racial
difference.”
18
For Ngai, a racial approach to Americanism tainted all of the
organs of government―the military agencies that hatched and executed the plan
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to remove the West Coast’s population of Japanese ancestry and the civilian
agency that oversaw their continued detention in the so-called “Relocation
Centers” such as Manzanar, Minidoka, and Heart Mountain. The “nullification of
Japanese Americans’ citizenship,” Ngai argues, was “a constitutive element” not
just of military removal but civilian detention.
19
Richard Drinnon, writing about
WRA Director Dillon S. Myer in his book Keeper of Concentration Camps,
provocatively asserts that “[e]ven when they tried, white officials failed to keep
more than half buried their conviction that not only the Japanese immigrants ...
but also the American-born Nisei were ineradicably alien.”
20
Racism, on these
scholars’ view, pervaded every piece of the government’s wartime program.
In such a highly racialized environment, Japanese Americans’ dissatisfaction
with their treatment could equate with only one thing if it rose to the level of
articulation: disloyalty. To protest the government’s violation of civil rights was
to confess bad Americanism. So powerful was this connection between dissent
and bad citizenship that it dominated the thinking not just of government officials,
but also of the leading Nisei advocacy group, Mike Masaoka’s Japanese
American Citizens League. This organization worked not to support but to
undermine the protests of removal and detention that some Nisei mounted in the
months and years after the government’s repressive program began.
21
The urgent
need of Japanese Americans to efface the racial boundary on citizenship that had
stripped them of their claim to good Americanism left no space for the idea of
loyal protest.
This, then, was the racial hole in which Japanese Americans found themselves
at war’s end, according to the conventional account of the period. And it would
take two distinct developments before Japanese Americans could step out of that
hole and into full Americanism. The first of these was one that Tokie Slocum’s
experience, and Lucy Salyer’s scholarship, would predict: a renewed appeal to
the ideal of military citizenship. At war’s end, Japanese Americans and their
allies would point with great pride―and great success―at the extraordinary
service record of the members of the segregated all-Nisei 442
nd
Regimental
Combat Team, many of whom had volunteered or been drafted from behind the
barbed wire of the government’s detention camps to fight for their country on the
battlefields of Europe.
22
Through their sacrifices, these warriors would reestablish
the candidacy of the Nisei for membership in the American polity, even if their
valor could not in itself secure them that membership. Full membership would
have to await the racially and culturally pluralist idea of Americanism that came
to life through the racial, ethnic, and gender solidarity movements of the 1960s
and the legal battles waged in those years against racial and gender segregation
and oppression.
Only then, after the travails of the soldiers of the 442
nd
and the pluralist
transformation of the 1960s, could a wounded veteran of the 442
nd
, Senator
Daniel Inouye of Hawaii, stand in a sufficiently secure position to help bring
down an American president as a member of the Senate Watergate Committee
Eric L. MULLER
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without enduring charges of being un-American.
23
Only after that could a Nisei
politician, Norman Mineta, represent an ascendant Silicon Valley in the United
States Congress, or a Sansei athlete, Kristi Yamaguchi, become an Olympic
champion and America’s sweetheart. And only after those triumphs of good
Americanism could two Sansei soldiers, Eric Shinseki and Ehren Watada, dare to
step out and publicly question an American military venture.
＊ ＊ ＊
By referring to what I have just set out as the “conventional” narrative about
the opening of Americanism to Americans of Japanese ancestry, I do not mean to
denigrate it, or even to suggest that the arc of the narrative is basically erroneous.
I do wish, however, to offer one observation about it: it depicts the years between
the entry of the United States into World War I and the end of World War II as
entirely lost to racial and nativist conceptions of Americanism. In particular, it
characterizes―even caricatures―the government’s repressive program against
Japanese Americans in World War II as a more or less monolithic culmination of
the racialism of the interwar years. All of the growth in the conception of Nisei
(and, later, Sansei) Americanism, and all of the increased possibility for pluralism
and dissent, comes after 1945.
To be sure, certain branches and officials of the U.S. Army helped sear this
caricature into historical memory. In his report justifying the decision to evict all
people of Japanese (but not German or Italian) ancestry from the coast in the
spring of 1942, Lieutenant General John DeWitt, the commander of the Western
Defense Command, candidly reported a racial and nativist justification for the
whole operation: “The Japanese race is an enemy race,” he wrote, “and while
many second and third generation Japanese born on United States soil, possessed
of United States citizenship, have become ‘Americanized,’ the racial strains are
undiluted.”
24
Or, as he put it more bluntly to the newspapers, “A Jap’s a Jap.”
25
The Navy shared DeWitt’s assessment; it never accepted a single Japanese
American as a sailor during the war. And this broad racial condemnation of
people of Japanese ancestry did not fade for some military officers even after the
early military crisis abated. As late as 1944, when the Army began training
loyalty examiners to determine which individual Japanese Americans deserved to
continue to be excluded on an individual basis from the West Coast after the mass
exclusion of Japanese Americans came to an end, one of its teachers preached to
his trainees that Japanese “civilization [was] different from what we call
civilization among Western people” and that “the Japanese are considered a very
primitive people so far as racial characteristics are concerned and so far as brain
development is concerned.”
26
But it would be a mistake to view this ugly racial nativism as defining the
entirety of the government’s approach to the question of what it meant for
Japanese Americans to count as “American” during the war years. While it is
true that the genesis of the government’s removal and detention of Japanese
Americans was coarsely racial, events quickly pressed various government
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agencies past that exclusively racial grounding into territory where different and
broader conceptions of Americanism could flourish. To be sure, none of these
conceptions bear much resemblance to what we today might deem culturally
pluralist or celebratory of the right to dissent. In the context of its time, however,
the wartime disagreements among various federal government units and branches
were remarkably robust.
Had the federal government simply locked up the West Coast’s Japanese
American population in the spring and summer of 1942 and thrown away the key
for the war’s duration, such disagreements would not have occurred. But this is
not what happened. By the end of 1942, after responsibility for the oversight of
the detained Japanese Americans had passed from military to civilian hands, a
complex set of pressures arose that pushed in the direction of liberty for some
internees and closer confinement for others, and that required government
agencies to evaluate the loyalties of individual Japanese Americans.
Pressure to release some Japanese Americans from the camps came from
several sources. For one, business interests―especially agricultural ones―near
the ten camp sites in Wyoming, Idaho, California, Utah, Arizona, Colorado, and
Arkansas recognized that the idle Japanese Americans behind barbed wire were a
potential source of cheap labor. They lobbied for temporary work release for
internees. Another somewhat ironic pressure for freedom for some internees
came from units within the military. The army’s Military Intelligence Service
recognized early on that it would need soldiers who could speak Japanese; it
quietly began looking for such soldiers in the camps as early as the mid-summer
of 1942. Similarly, by the fall of 1942, the Japanese American Citizens’ League
had persuaded John J. McCloy, the Assistant Secretary of War, that young Nisei
men ought to be permitted to volunteer out of the camps and into the armed forces
in order to rehabilitate the good Americanism of the Nisei as a group in the public
eye. Finally, the War Relocation Authority (“WRA”), the civilian agency that
administered the ten camps, had its own reasons to want to release some of the
Japanese Americans it was detaining. WRA officials saw danger in creating a
culture of permanent detention and dependency for Japanese Americans and
thought the opportunity to leave camp for new jobs and lives in the country’s
interior was crucial to the health of the Japanese American community. More
cynically, WRA lawyers knew that the mass detention of Japanese Americans
would be challenged in court, and advised the agency that a liberal furlough
program for some internees would make it likelier that courts would uphold the
detention of others.
27
At the same time, there were pressures to shift some internees to even tighter
confinement. Political leaders in the white communities adjacent to the camps
argued that for security reasons, internees should be forbidden from leaving the
premises. Occasional unrest in the camps drew media attention and calls for
tougher treatment and closer confinement of the internees. Eventually these calls
matured into demands, both from legislators and from military officials, for the
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out-and-out segregation of the supposedly disloyal internees from the rest of the
internee population. These demands fell on receptive ears at the civilian WRA.
That agency came to see by the end of 1942 that it was running ten small cities
with a total population of over 100,000 people, and that some of those people
were what they called “troublemakers”―Japanese Americans whom they saw not
so much as disloyal but as disruptive to the smooth operation of the camps.
Segregation gave the WRA the opportunity to sift out its most troublesome
individuals and shift them to a single camp, Tule Lake.
28
By early 1943, the War Department, wishing to create the segregated Nisei
unit that would become the 442
nd
Regimental Combat Team, proposed a program
of individually adjudicating the loyalty of all of the young men in the camps. The
idea was that in a process that became known as “registration,” military teams
would administer a questionnaire to all male American citizens of draft age in the
camps, and from the results of the questionnaire, determine who was loyal enough
to serve in the army. The War Relocation Authority, seeing these questionnaires
as a helpful way to decide which internees were loyal enough to be permitted to
leave camp for new jobs and homes in the country’s interior, agreed to the
military’s proposal and expanded the scope of the registration to include all adult
internees rather than just the young men of draft age. In the late winter and early
spring, military teams fanned out across the ten camps to administer the
registration questionnaires.
29
The four-page forms were, in essence, a bureaucratic inquest into the
Americanism of the incarcerated Japanese American community. The forms
sought a wealth of primarily biographical and cultural information from the
internees, who were asked to report on whether they had any relatives in Japan,
the extent of any education they had received in Japan, whether they had ever
traveled to Japan, whether they held dual citizenship, what their religion was,
what organizations they belonged to, what newspapers and magazines they read,
what entities they had made financial contributions to, whether they knew spoken
or written Japanese, and the like. The two final questions, numbers 27 and 28,
asked each internee whether he or she was willing to serve in the armed forces
wherever he or she might be ordered and whether he or she was willing to
forswear allegiance to the Japanese Emperor.
Registration was a gross miscalculation on the part of both the military and
the WRA. Many internees, resentful at having been uprooted from their homes
on racial suspicion of disloyalty and incarcerated for a year in desolate camps, had
little desire to undergo this kind of scrutiny. Many feared that registration was a
prelude to breaking up their families and communities, or to forcing them out into
hostile white communities. Question 27, about military service, was understood
as seeking to trick them into volunteering into the army. And Question 28, the
so-called “loyalty” question, was the most infuriating of all; it insulted the Nisei
by asking them to renounce a supposed allegiance to the Emperor that none of
them had ever sworn in the first place.
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The internees’ responses to the registration questionnaires were not what
either military or civilian officials had anticipated. A stunning twelve percent of
those who filled out the questionnaire either answered the loyalty question with an
outright “no” or qualified an affirmative answer. The “mortality of loyalty,” as
an official in the Assistant Secretary of War’s Office called it, was particularly
high among Nisei men: more than one in five of them answered “no” to the
loyalty question. And even more disturbingly to military and civilian officials,
many internees responded to the registration process by filing requests for
repatriation (in the case of the Issei) or expatriation (in the case of Nisei) to Japan.
What had been designed as a sifting mechanism became, to a significant degree, a
vent for the internees’ anger and frustrations and an invitation to dissent and
resistance.
30
With tens of thousands of completed questionnaires on their hands, military
and civilian officials then had the problem of reducing the answers and other
available intelligence data to concrete conclusions about who was and who was
not a loyal American. This is where we can see the emergence of some striking
differences between the military and civilian conceptions of Americanism. Two
rival systems of loyalty adjudication sprang up from this data, one of them
dominated by the military and the other controlled by the civilian WRA. The
military-dominated system, called the Japanese American Joint Board (“JAJB”),
was responsible for making recommendations on who was loyal enough to be
allowed to leave camp as well as findings on which of the incarcerated Japanese
Americans could, if released, be granted permission to take jobs in industries
deemed to be of military sensitivity. The other system, developed and
implemented by the civilian WRA, was designed to make an ultimate
determination on which internees were sufficiently loyal to be allowed to leave a
camp for a new job and home in the country’s interior.
31
The JAJB and the WRA each developed its own crude point system to turn an
internee’s answers on his or her registration questionnaire into a total loyalty
score.
32
Consider these excerpts from the two systems of evaluation
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Excerpts from the Japanese American Joint Board’s Point System
Ques. 7.
33
a. If registered in Communist Party.
b. If registered voter.
2-minus
1-plus
Ques. 8. a. If spouse is citizen of Japan.
b. If spouse is a Nisei.
1-minus
1-plus
Ques. 12. a. If subject has one or more of the following in Japan: wife, children,
parents, brothers, or sisters.
3-minus
Ques. 13. d. If subject attended Japanese Language School more than 3 years in this
country.
f. If subject received entire education from schools in U.S.
2-minus
3-plus
Ques. 14. a. If subject has traveled to Japan 3 or more times.
d. If subject has traveled to Japan once.
e. If subject has traveled to Japan twice.
f. If subject has never traveled to Japan.
Reject
1-minus
3-minus
1-plus
Ques. 15. d. If subject was employed as Japanese Language School instructor.
g. If subject was employed by reputable American business doing business
only in U.S.
3-minus
2-plus
Ques. 16 a. If subject is Shintoist.
b. If subject is a Buddhist.
c. If subject is Christian.
Reject
1-minus
2-plus
Ques. 18 a. If subject reads, writes and speaks Japanese good.
b. If subject reads and/ or writes Japanese fair or good.
2-minus
1-minus
Ques. 19 a. If subject is an instructor in Japanese hobbies or sports. (Jyudo, Kyudo,
and Kendo)
b. If subject is an instructor in American sport or hobby.
2-minus
2-plus
Ques. 24 a. For each Japanese or Japanese-American periodical, trade journal or
magazine.
1-minus
Ques. 26 a. If subject himself has ever applied for repatriation. Reject
34
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Excerpts from the War Relocation Authority’s Point System
Weight
Positive Negative
Question 7
35
1. Registered voter 1 or 2
36
Question 8
2. Married, and spouse is a Japanese alien
3. Married and spouse is not of Japanese race 3
Question 12
1. Parents living and in Japan 1
3. Brothers, sisters, in Japan 1
4. Married and spouse now in Japan 2
5. Parent, sons, or brothers in Japanese military 3
Question 13
1. Attended American high school 1
2. Graduate of American high school 2
9. Attendance at Japanese language school in U. S. for more than two
years
1
Question 14
1. Traveled twice to Japan since 1935 2
2. Traveled three or more times to Japan since 1935 3
Question 15
5. Employment by an American-Caucasian firm or individual except
canneries, fisheries, or other Japanese gang labor employers
2
6. Occupation―Japanese language school instructor 3
Question 16
1. Christian 1
2. Buddhist priests 2
3. Shinto Priests (Tenriko sect) 3
4. Shinto Priests (Dai Jingu shrine) Deny
Question 19
1. Japanese sports instructor 2
Question 26
1. Application for expatriation to Japan
Subsequent application for cancellation
No subsequent application for cancellation
2
Deny
37
To our early-twenty-first-century eyes, both agencies’ systems blunderingly
conflated a handful of cultural contacts with good or lapsed Americanism, and
both proceeded from the same absurd assumption that national identity and
loyalty were matters that could be quantified and tallied like points in a tennis
match. In addition, it must be noted that there were instances of numerical
agreement between the military and civilian systems: they agreed on the
significance of Nisei employment, for example, and assigned the same negative
point values to being an instructor of Japanese language in the United States.
But what is important for the purposes of this study are the differences
between the two systems, and the considerably greater space that the civilian
WRA opened up for Nisei Americanism than its military counterpart. In the eyes
of the JAJB, a citizen’s Americanism was impeached if he or she had a non-
citizen spouse; this was not troubling to the WRA so long as the spouse was not
in Japan. Having any first-degree relation in Japan was deeply damning for the
JAJB; it was markedly less so for the WRA. The WRA deemed a Nisei’s
attendance at a Japanese language after-school program to be far less threatening
to his or her status as an American than did the JAJB. The JAJB was only
prepared to award a Nisei positive loyalty points if he or she had gotten all of his
or her schooling in the United States; the WRA awarded positive points just for
high school. If a Nisei practiced the Shinto religion, or had taken three or more
trips to Japan, the JAJB saw these as absolutely fatal to a Nisei’s Americanism;
the civilian WRA did not. While both systems saw Christianity as favoring
Americanism, the military-dominated JAJB saw Buddhism as detracting from it
while the WRA did not. The WRA did not see Japanese language abilities as
undermining a Nisei’s Americanism; the JAJB did. Neither was the WRA
concerned if a Nisei read Japanese or Japanese-American magazines, but the
JAJB assigned a negative point for each such publication. And the JAJB wanted
to know whether a Nisei was a communist, while the WRA assessed no negative
points for a Nisei’s political views no matter what they were.
For a better sense of how the military and civilian systems differed, consider
the case of a hypothetical Nisei farm worker in his early twenties who got his
education through high school in the United States, traveled to Japan once as a
child to visit relatives, attended four years of a Japanese-language after-school
program in the United States while in elementary and junior high school, had a
sister in Japan and a brother in the U.S. Army, read the English-language Rafu
Shimpo newspaper published in Los Angeles, attended a Buddhist church, and
was a registered voter. This imaginary (but not atypical) young man would have
received a loyalty score of negative two from the JAJB but a positive six from the
WRA.
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While the archival record does not reveal how many points a Nisei
needed for a positive finding by either agency, this was a remarkably different
assessment of the American identity of an American citizen.
The differences between the two systems were not simply academic. They
had real impacts on the lives of Japanese Americans. For a number of reasons not
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germane to this study, the two systems were called upon to make parallel findings
in many thousands of cases. And much to the anger of the military officials on
the JAJB, the WRA, pursuant to its own adjudications, released one out of every
three internees whom the JAJB had found disloyal.
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The military and civilian agencies also developed markedly different
understandings of the decisions of some Nisei to answer “no” to Question 28 on
the registration form, the so-called “loyalty question,” as well as to the decisions
of some Nisei to seek expatriation to Japan. It must be remembered that these
“no” answers and expatriation requests came at a time when Japanese Americans
had already been forced from their homes, with all of the personal and property
loss that eviction entailed, and then incarcerated for at least a year in tarpaper
barracks behind barbed wire without any semblance of legal process―and all of
this on account of nothing more than the fact of their ancestry. This was a
moment of great anxiety within the camps, as many Issei and Nisei internees
feared that the government might be implementing plans to break up families by
forcing some internees out of the camps into the military or what they feared
would be a hostile American society. It was, in other words, a time of enormous
stress, fear, resentment, and anger in the camps.
The military understanding of “no” answers to the loyalty question and
requests for expatriation was breathtakingly simple: they were a declaration of
disloyalty, a confession that the internee considered him- or herself Japanese and
not American. Even an internee’s subsequent request to rescind his or her “no”
answer or to withdraw his or her request for expatriation meant nothing to the
military. The military undertook no investigation of the circumstances leading to
the “no” answer or the expatriation request; it simply accepted the piece of paper
filed by the internee at face value and concluded that he or she was disloyal.
The civilian War Relocation Authority, however, appreciated that matters
were not so simple. WRA officials understood that the registration questionnaires
had brought to the surface complex feelings swirling within the camps―anger,
worry, resentment, and frustration. They also understood that what the
questionnaires had precipitated was a crisis over civil rights rather than loyalty.
Thus, in April of 1943, the Chief of the WRA’s Community Analysis Section
confirmed in a memorandum to the Chief of the WRA’s Community Management
Section that “[s]ince civil rights was the main issue [at the camps] in relation to
registration, no repressive measures should be taken against persons who, through
their objections to registration, were attempting to defend their civil rights,”
including “a number of people who answered ‘No’ or gave qualified answers to
Question 28.” This official found it nothing short of “Machiavellian to thrust self-
respecting citizens into concentration camp conditions and then call them disloyal
for protesting this treatment by refusing to pledge allegiance in this situation.”
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The WRA’s director, Dillon Myer, was similarly perceptive about the complex
motives that had led to many citizens’ requests for expatriation. “[I]n many
cases,” he noted in the summer of 1944, “requests for expatriation [were] not
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motivated by pro-Japanese or anti-American attitudes,” but instead came from “a
fear of forced relocation [out of a camp]” or “were the result of parental or group
pressure.”
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The WRA acted on these more nuanced understandings. Rather than
automatically treat “no” answers to Question 28 and requests for expatriation as
conclusive evidence of disloyalty, the WRA sought further information. For each
internee who answered ‘no’ to Question 28, or qualified his answer in some way,
or requested expatriation, the WRA held a hearing at which the internee had the
chance to change or explain the negative answer or expatriation request. WRA
hearing officers would question the internee about what had led him or her to such
a potentially fateful decision. As the WRA’s top lawyer put it, only where the
WRA was comfortable that the internee “appreciated the significance and
consequences of his action and was not merely acting out of temporary anger or
bitterness” would the WRA conclude that the internee was “definitely deciding
upon allegiance to Japan.”
42
This brief comparison of the military and civilian approaches to adjudicating
the loyalty of individual Japanese Americans between 1943 and 1945 reveals that
the government’s conception of Americanism was no racialist monolith. In
particular, the civilian War Relocation Authority showed in a number of ways that
a conception of Americanism that was at least modestly pluralist and tolerant of
dissent thrived during the war years. In evaluating the allegiances of individual
Japanese Americans, the WRA steered clear of the rank racial nativism that
plagued the work of the military-dominated Japanese American Joint Board and
managed to implement a test of Americanism that attached no strong negative
valence to certain Japanese cultural, linguistic, and religious practices. To be
sure, the WRA’s approach was more fiercely assimilationist than the pre-World-
War-I cosmopolitan progressives would have preferred.
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By today’s standards, it
is not even faintly a model of cultural pluralism. But for a time of “total war,”
and a repressive episode that is typically understood as monochromatically
racialist, the WRA’s definition of Americanism shows unexpected shades of
color.
Similarly, in its approach to “no” answers on the loyalty questionnaire and to
requests for expatriation, the WRA revealed a surprising appreciation for the
conception of Americanism that Louis Brandeis had articulated at Faneuil Hall
back in 1915. Brandeis had argued that some of those thought to be outside the
American body politic might well be fully American by virtue of their
commitment to substantive and procedural justice, and that the nation could
undermine those new but true Americans by denying them justice. Dissent and
what we might call justified disaffection did not, for Brandeis, inherently detract
from good Americanism. This was an idea that military officials assessing
Japanese Americans’ loyalties in World War II could never grasp. To them, a
Japanese American’s “no” answer or expatriation request was invariably an
admission of unamericanism. The WRA, by contrast, proved itself able to
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appreciate the toll that months and even years of civil rights violations could take
on an incarcerated Japanese American. At least in this context,
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the WRA was
able to understand that protest could come from a frustrated commitment to
American norms of justice and that it did not need to represent a subversion or
repudiation of Americanism.
＊ ＊ ＊
The evidence that I have offered in this paper tends at least mildly to
complicate the prevailing narrative about the government’s approach to
Americanism during the years of World War II. Whereas Lucy Salyer’s work on
World War I and the interwar period would imply that only a warrior model of
citizenship might overcome the prevailing racial model, my evidence suggests
that in at least some quarters of government, a third model remained viable, one at
least somewhat more understanding of cultural difference and somewhat less
insistent upon unquestioning obedience. Whereas scholars such as Mae Ngai and
Richard Drinnon see racialism as pervading all of the conditions that the
government imposed on Japanese Americans’ entitlement to membership in the
American polity, my evidence suggests differences in the kind and degree of
impact that race played for the leading military and civilian agencies, with the
civilian WRA taking an approach that was, at least in the context of its time,
progressive.
Here I use the word “progressive” advisedly. In the WRA’s methods of
assessing the Americanism of Japanese Americans, we can hear at least an echo
of the ideas of the cosmopolitan progressives of the pre-World-War-I years. It
has generally been assumed that that movement’s project went on hiatus in the
days leading up to the Great War and did not resume until taken up by others well
after World War II drew to a close. My evidence suggests that the project did not
entirely vanish during the war and interwar years, and that Americanism remained
a contested idea within the federal government even in a time of total war. This is
not to say that WRA officials, were they alive today, would be pleased to know
that General Eric Shinseki and Lieutenant Ehren Watada took the lead in publicly
questioning an American war and its planning. It is, however, to say that the road
that led to the American ground beneath Shinseki and Watada ran through, rather
than around, the Japanese American internment camps of World War II.
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